Approved For Release 280 VPALE CIA-RDP82-00457R007600090003-0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REPORT NO.

INFORMATION REPORT

CD NO.

25X1A

	사람이 보고 있었다면 하다 하는 것이 되었다. 그 사람들은 사람들은 사람들은 사람들은 사람들은 사람들은 사람들은 사람들은			. ~
COUNTRY	Germany (Western Zones)		DATE DISTR. 29 N	MY 51
SUBJECT	Attitude of Ruhr Industrialists on Co-Determination and Schuman Plan	•	NO. OF PAGES	2
PLACE ACQUIRED	25X1A Document No. 3 No Change In Class,		NO. OF ENCLS.	
DATE OF INFO.	☐ Declassified Glass, Changed To: TS Autho: HR 70-2	s (b)	SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO.	25X1X

The following report reflects the opinions of several prominent dest-Cerman industrial leaders.

- 1. When the German Federal Covernment agreed early this year with labor and management representatives on the draft of a co-determination law for the steel and coal industries, giving the Deutsche Gewerkschafts Bund (DGB) the major voice in nominating labor representatives for factory management boards, managers of many large Ruhr steel plants were convinced that the era of private management had ended. They were apprehensive that their own positions were no longer secure and in private conversations discussed ways and means of placating labor union leaders who would soon, they thought, share their managerial prerogatives. The difficulty, however, which the Government and labor are having in getting the Bundestag to accept the original co-determination draft has heartened many of the plant managers, and they now feel that there is a fighting chance that private ownership and management will keep the upper hand. If the Bundestag denies the DCB the right to nominate all or most of the labor representatives on plant boards, workers in the plants will have the major voice, and the managers feel that their own experience, the superior financial resources of management, and the inherent decility of German workers will work in favor of private ownership and control.
- 2. As of Thursday, 29 March 1951, the managers of many of the largest Ruhr steel plants did not know how their plants would be affected by the reorganization of German heavy industry agreed on between the U.S. High Commissioner and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in their talks on the Schuman Plan. The final reorganization plan, discussed and approved by the Allied High Commission on that day was still a mystery to most of the actual plant managers, who felt that the German Government had consulted primarily the owners of the "liquidated" Ruhr firms, rather than the present managers.
- 3. It was the opinion of a number of important Euhr industrial officials that the reorganization and deconcentration of German heavy industry, envisioned by the Allies as a step in implementing the Schuman Flan as well as a key feature of U.S. occupation policy, would be nullified by the machinations of the plants' owners soon after the Schuman Plan was signed. The supposition in managerial circles is that Euhr owners, once their rights are restored, will balk at producing war material for western defense, until they are permitted to reintegrate their separate

P. C.	CLASSIFICA	I SWITCH TOOMIN	OL - U.S.	OFFICIALS	OULY	
STATE IT X NAVY	NSRB	DISTRIBU	TION			
ARMY IF X AIR	if X FBI	OM Ea				

Approved For Release 200 104 19 : CIA-RDP82-00457 R007600090003-0

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-2-

25X1A

plants into sorething resorbling the old "concern" system. They will argue that a large-scale defense production effort is possible only if they are sclowed to combine and "rationalize" their purchase of raw materials, production planning, marketing, price structure, shipping, and financing.

CONFACET CONTROL/U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY